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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ST ATE O.F UTAH, 
Plrti Ill iff-R C8,1jOJld c ll t, 
vs. 
SYLYESTER SCOTT, 
Defenda nt-ApiJcllr: ;1 t. 
Case No. 
10876 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~IENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Sylvester Scott, appeals from a 
judgment of conviction finding him guilty of burglary 
in the second degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty by jury verdict 
of burglary in the second degree. The trial judge sen-
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tenced the appellant to the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the judgment of the 
trial court be affirmed. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
On or about the night of April 18, 1966, the U and 
I :Furniture Store in Ogden, Utah was burglarized. 
Three television sets and a coffee table were discovered 
m1ssmg. .Mr. Gary Bosworth, the manager of the 
burglarized store, testified that the appellant had come 
to the store several times prior to the burglary to look 
at a three-piece sectional couch ( T-16) . 
On the morning of April 18, 1966, appellant 
entered the store with three other persons, two of whom 
used a restroom located in the office of the store ( T-36). 
During the afternoon of the following day Mr. Bos-
worth discovered three televisions and a coffee table 
missing (T-19). On the day following the discovery 
of the theft, l.\fr. Bosworth found that the screen to 
the office restroom had been removed and that a foot 
mark had been left on a crushed facial tissue box on 
the top of the toilet tank ( T-57-58) . 
Copeland Griffin testified that he had been ap-
proached by the appellant and one 'Villiam Coleman 
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and asked whether he would haul some furniture for 
them from a place on 'Vall Avenue and Riverdale 
( T-69). Griffin testified that he told them he could 
not do it, but that he subsequently went to Wall Avenue 
and Riverdale on the night of April 18, 1966, where 
he observed Coleman and the appellant removing a 
coffee table and a television set from the store (T-
69-70). 
On the basis of information received from Mr. 
Griffin, a search warrant was issued to James Wold, 
Chief of Police at South Ogden, Utah, who recovered 
one of the television sets and what appeared to be the 
coffee table stolen from the U and I furniture Store 
from the residence of Carol Jean Craig ( T-137-139). 
Counsel for defense presented two witnesses, Carol 
Jean Craig and Annette House, who testified that they 
had each purchased televlsion sets from Copeland 
Griffin (T-178-195). 
James Wold testified that Carol Jean Craig had 
first told him that a person named Davis had sold her 
the television set, but later changed the name to O'Neal 
(T-186-188) and that she was married to Sylvester 
Scott (T-139) .. Miss Craig testified that the reason Scott 
came to her house is that she liked him a lot and that 
she had had his baby (T-189). 
Annette House testified that she had known 'Vil-
liam Coleman for many years and that the defendants 
would come and stay at her house for weeks at a time 
(T-201). 
3 
The record discloses that the attorney for 'Villiam 
Coleman, Robert Phillips, had entered a "Notice of 
Alibi" to the effect that 'Villiam Coleman had been in 
the presence of Linda Martin and Annette House on 
the night of the burglary (T-201). Mr. Phillips took 
the witness stand and testified that his client had indi-
cated that he had an alibi and that the names of Linda 
Martin and Annette House had been given to his sec-
retary. Through some mistake, these names appeared 
on the "Notice of Alibi" ( T-208) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PER-
lMITTED COPELAND GRIFFIN TO TES-
TIFY. 
The appellant contends that Copeland Griffin is 
incompetent to testify because Griffin had been found 
legally insane and committed to the Utah State l\Iental 
Hospital in 1962, ~nd the trial court made no effort to 
deter~ine whether he understood the nature of an oath. 
File 7091 from the Second District Court shows 
that Copeland Griffin .was adjudged legally insane by 
the Honorable John F. 'Vahlquist, November 1, 1962, 
and ordered committed to the Utah State Mental Hos-
pital for an indeterminate period of time or until he 
recovered at which time he was to be returned to the 
Weber County Jail for prosecution. 
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By order dated November 12, 1965, a sanity hear-
ing was ordered for Copeland Griff in to be set by the 
court within the next ten days. On November 30, 1965, 
Copeland Griffin entered a plea of guilty to a reduced 
charge of petty larceny. The court entered sentence 
and ruled that the defendant could be returned to the 
State Hospital at any time on a determination by the 
State Hospital. On December 5, 1965, the State Hos-
pital discharged Copeland Griffin, listing his condition 
"' d,, as improve . 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-48-5 (Supp. 1967) provides: 
If upon the examination provided for herein 
the accused is determined to be insane, the judge 
making such determination shall order him com .. 
mitted to the state hospital, there to remain in 
custody until he shall become sane ... 
Upon the accused becoming sane after com-
mitment to the state hospital the superintendent 
thereof shall certify such fact to the district court 
in and for the county from which the accused 
was committed, and thereupon the judge of such 
court shall order the accused returned to the 
original custody from which he was taken in 
execution of his commitment, and upon such 
return all proceedings against him suspended 
upon his commitment shall be resumed . . . 
The record shows that Griffin was released from 
the state mental hospital and returned to the custody 
of jurisdiction from which he was taken and that the 
court accepted a plea of guilty to a reduced charge. of 
petit larceny and entered judgment. 
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In Smith v. Roach, 56 'Vyo. 205, 106 P.2d 536 
( 1940), under a statute which provided that when any 
person committed to the state mental hospital is de-
clared not insane, he shall be released, the court held 
the fact of petitioner's sanity to be established, at least 
prima facie, by his discharge from the state hospital. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-48-1 (1953) provides that no 
person while insane shall be tried, adjudged to punish 
or punished for a public offense. 
Since the record shows that Griffin entered a plea 
of guilty to the reduced charge of petit larceny and was 
subsequently sentenced by the same trial judge who 
had found him to be insane, that court necessarily had 
to determine him sane for purposes of trial. In the ab-
sence of a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that 
judicial proceedings are regular in all respects. State 
v. Reay, 13 Utah2d 79, 368 P.2d 595 (1962). 
Respondent submits the Copeland Griffin's sanity 
was established, at least prima facie, by his discharge 
from the state mental hospital and by the court entering 
judgment against him. 
Respondent further submits that it is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court to determine the 
competency of a witness. 
In State v. Williams, 11 Utah 379, 180 P.2d 551 
( 1947) , where the competency of the alleged victim, 
a thirteen year old girl whose mental age was between 
eight and ten years, was challenged, the court held: 
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... the trial judge had the advantage of 
having the witness before him. He was in a posi-
tion to observe not only her demeanor but the 
tempo of question and answer, the attitude and 
tone of voice of counsel and the courtroom en-
viroumen t. Hence, much of importance to his 
decision respecting the competency of the wit-
ness was available to the trial judge which the 
record does not reveal to us. He exercised his 
discretion in light of such additional factors, and 
we are unable to say with conviction that his 
ruling thereon was an abuse of such discretion. 
The record shows that the trial judge in this case 
was the same judge who had earlier found the witness 
insane; it was the same trial judge who later accepted 
a plea of guilty from the witness and entered judg-
ment against him. The same trial judge questioned the 
witness to determine whether he had the mental and 
physical capacity to understand and respond to ques-
tions put to him. The record is replete with questions 
put to the witness by all counsel and answers from the 
witness which cogently demonstrate the witness' ability 
to understand, comprehend and respond. 
Respondent submits that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting Copeland Griffin to 
testify. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE 
LA 'V OF COMPLICITY. 
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Appellant contends that the evidence was sufficient 
to require the trial court to instruct the jury concerning 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-31-18 (1953) which requires that 
the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated by other 
evidence. 
The only testimony which might connect Griffin 
with the crime is that of Carol Jean Craig and Annette 
House. Both testified that Griffin had sold them tele-
vision sets which were later identified as those stolen 
from the U and I Furniture Stores. Their testimony, 
if believed, could establish only that Griffin was in the 
possession of stolen goods after the burglary. 
Respondent submits that there is no evidence to 
support the appellant's contention that a jury could 
find that Copeland Griffin was an accomplice. 
In People v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737 
( 1891), the court held that an accessory after the fact 
was not an accomplice within the meaning of § 5049, 
2 Comp. Laws, 1888, 710, from which Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-31-18 (1953) is taken with minor changes. The 
court further held in Chadwick that if the witness were 
not an accomplice in the crime, it was not necessary 
that his testimony be corroborated. 
In State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 548 ,70 P.2d 
458, 461 ( 1937) , the court held: 
An accessory after the fact is not an accomplice, 
and neither is one who might be charged or con· 
victed of some other crime not the crime for 
which the defendant was on trial. 
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Since there was no evidence that Copeland Griffin 
participated in the burglary, it was not error for the 
trial court not to have instructed the jury on the require-
ment under Utah law that an accomplice's testimony 
must be corroborated by other evidence. 
Respondent further submits that the appellant 
should not be permitted to object to an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal where no instruction on the 
testimony of an accomplice was requested and where 
no objection was made when the court failed to give 
instructions on the testimony of an accomplice. 
In State v. Blea, 20 Utah 2d 133, 434 P.2d 446 
( 1967) , the court held that even if the law had been as 
defendant contended, he was in a poor position to com-
plain on appeal of failure to instruct the jury thereon 
where he did not request any such instructions nor did he 
take any exceptions to the f allure of the court to so 
instruct. 
Generally, unless an instruction is requested on 
a special matter, failure to give it cannot be a basis of 
claimed prejudicial error. State v. Owem, 15 Utah2d 
123, 388 P.2d 797 (1964). 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence that Copeland Griffin had been 
released from the State .Mental Hospital and had been 
permitted to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of 
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petty larceny is sufficient to show that the trial court : 
did not abuse its discretion in permitting him to testify. •, 
I 
The trial court's determination that Copeland t 
Griffin was a competent witness is further sustained f 
by lVIr. Griff in' s ability to respond coherently to ques- i 
tions asked by both the prosecuting and defense attor- i 
~~. I 
The trial court did not err in not instructing the I 
I 
jury on the law of complicity since the evidence did '. 
not raise that issue and the appellant did not request I 
instructions on the law of accomplice nor did he object I 
to the trial court not giving the instruction. 
For these reasons, respondent requests that the 
judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
C. VAN DRUNEN 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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